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China’s Belt and Road Initiative seems to focus on 
connections with Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern 
Europe. But the country’s economic future is really in 
“netware” technology, similar to America’s. Contrary to 
how BRI is viewed and talked about now, China’s more 
profitable path actually points, as illuminated by the likes 
of Alibaba and Tencent, eastward to California. 
 
The enshrining of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in China’s constitution in October 2017 
ensures that it will guide vast swaths of Chinese foreign policy for decades to come. In 
essence, BRI connects sunset industries plagued by overcapacity (steel, construction, heavy 
engineering) to low- and middle-income countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. 
But while BRI looks west, China’s real growth centers, like Shanghai’s Pudong, 
Shenzhen’s Huaqiangbei, and Beijing’s Zhongguancun, are looking east—to California. 
To the West, Declining Industries 
BRI looks great on a map, but on the ground it is much less impressive. One of BRI’s shining 
gems is the Khorgos Gateway in Kazakhstan. Though reputed to be the biggest dry port in the 
world, it is essentially just a transshipment facility. It consists of little more than three 41-ton 
gantry cranes that are used to bridge the standard-gauge railways of China and the broad-
gauge railways of the former Soviet Union. 
Through Khorgos Gateway and other crossings, China plans to run 4000 trainsto Europe in 
2018. That may sound like a lot, but it’s roughly equivalent to one day’s traffic at the Port of 
Shanghai. China’s other western border crossings are even more forlorn. 
BRI looks great on a map, but on the ground it is 
much less impressive. 
The Karakoram Highway linking China and Pakistan, reputed to cost US$55 billion, is 
a landslide-prone two-lane road that is closed in the winter. The Andijan-Osh-Irkeshtam 
railway from China through Central Asia has been stuck in the planning stages since 1997. 
To the East, the Rise of Tech Giants 
Compare Khorgos Gateway’s drab free trade zone with Shanghai’s flashy Pudong skyline, 
and the contrast between the Eurasian hinterland and China’s developed east coast couldn’t 
be clearer. More than exports, skyscrapers, and wealth, that gap is about the structure of the 
economy. 
The companies driving technological innovation and economic growth today are the 
online netware companies of eastern China. Netware is a loose category of technologies that 
includes social networks, online marketplaces, e-payment providers, ride-hailing services, 
and even computer games. 
After the state-owned oil giant Sinopec, China’s two most profitable non-financial companies 
are Tencent (“China’s Facebook”) and Alibaba (“China’s Amazon”). Tencent runs 
the ubiquitous WeChat social network, in addition to several other online services. Alibaba’s 
Taobao and Tmall e-commerce sites are respectively the number one and number two online 
marketplaces in the world. 
These netware champions, and others like them, are not only leaders in their own areas, but 
also in emerging technologies like virtual reality and artificial intelligence. And they all have 
three things in common: they leverage online network effects, they are built on American 
models, and they actually make money. 
Unlike hardware companies such as Lenovo, Huawei, and ZTE, which operate in fiercely 
competitive sectors driven by individual unit sales, China’s netware giants don’t generate 
profits from selling their products. They make money by helping people sell to each other. 
Calichina: China’s Deep Connections with California 
The idea of generating money from connecting people and businesses online is at the heart of 
Silicon Valley’s success. Though we still call it “Silicon” Valley, it’s hard to find any 
hardware in California these days. Apple may design its phones in Cupertino, but it doesn’t 
manufacture any. Apple makes its money by plugging users into an online services 
ecosystem based around iTunes and the App Store. 
Whether they are Chinese or American, all 
netware companies are built on American 
operating platforms. 
Now eastern China is going the same way. Apple’s iPhones, once made in coastal Shenzhen, 
are now mostly made in Zhengzhou, the capital of the poor inland province of Henan. 
China’s Huawei and ZTE have also moved production inland. China’s Silicon Valleys, like 
California’s, are now filling up with social networks, online marketplaces, e-payment 
providers, and sharing apps. 
All of these business models were pioneered on the west coast of the US, then imported in 
China. Baidu’s CEO Robin Li worked at Silicon Valley search engine pioneer 
Infoseek before co-founding Baidu in 2000. Jack Ma founded Alibaba in 2000 with Silicon 
Valley venture capital, then expanded it by merging it with Yahoo!’s China operations. 
Tencent was founded in 1999 as a clone of AOL’s ICQ service. They’ve all come a long way 
since those early days, but their close connections with Silicon Valley remain. 
Whether they are Chinese or American, all netware companies are built on American 
operating platforms (Android, iOS, Windows, or macOS). Whatever language they sell in, 
they are all programmed in American languages (Java, JavaScript, Perl, PHP, Python, and 
SQL). And wherever they are based, their underlying business models, though developed in 
China, were first imagined in America. 
If China is going to be one of the leading global technological centers of the 21st century 
(and all indications are that it will be), its companies will have to climb netware value chains 
that connect them to Silicon Valley, Seattle, and other American technology hubs. 
The Calichina technological ecosystem that links leading companies on both sides of the 
Pacific Ocean is the key to their shared economic future. 
China’s Real Growth Centers Look East, Not West 
We are used to thinking of Europe as the heart of “the Western world,” a group of developed 
countries with technologically advanced economies. But look at the emerging economy of the 
21st century, and there’s hardly a European company in sight. The most profitable (and most 
valuable) technology companies in the world are all based around the Pacific, and they’re all 
netware companies. 
Eurasia just doesn’t matter for China the way 
California does. 
Europe hardly figures into the business models of China’s netware champions, except 
perhaps as a rich but declining consumer market. They don’t operate on European platforms 
and they don’t follow European models. And their eventual European operations will be built 
around local European fulfilment centers, not serviced via rail from western China. 
Eurasia just doesn’t matter for China the way California does. BRI may be important for 
China’s old-fashioned exporters of cheap consumer goods who benefit from heavily 
subsidized overland transport. And it may be important for the state-owned heavy 
industries that build the physical infrastructure of places like Khorgos Gateway. But it is 
largely irrelevant for the industries that China is depending on to lead its future economy. 
China is pushing hard to develop 21st-century technologies like artificial intelligence, big 
data, blockchain, virtual reality, and the Internet of Things. All of these put it in direct 
competition with American companies, but also embed it in a shared technological ecosystem 
with the US. So forget romantic notions of reopening the Silk Roads connecting China to the 
West. The real transnational integration story of the 21st century is Calichina. 
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